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It may be frail; its roof may shake; the wind may blow through it; the
storm may enter; the rain may enter; but the King of England cannot
enter-all his forces dare not cross the threshold of the ruined tenement!'
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1997, San Diego County commenced "Project 100%," a program that
conditioned the receipt of welfare benefits on the recipient's consent to a "home
visit" or "walk-through" of his or her home by an investigator from the District
Attorney's Office.2 Law enforcement sought to "'redoubl[e]' its efforts to combat
fraud and 'assure program integrity."' 3 Proponents of the program called it
eligibility verification; opponents called it a warrantless search in violation of
welfare recipients' Fourth Amendment rights.4 Even late-night comedian Stephen
Colbert got involved in the debate.5 He compared one's constitutional rights to
the amenities of a new car and noted that welfare recipients had rights, just not
the "premium package."6 Other communities took notice and created programs
similar to the one in San Diego.7 The program even garnered the attention of
members of the California legislature.8
In Sanchez v. County of San Diego, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held
that conditioning the receipt of welfare assistance on mandatory home visits did
not violate welfare recipients' constitutional rights. 9 According to the court, San
Diego investigators' home visits did not qualify as "searches" within the meaning
1. Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301,307 (1958) (quoting William Pitt, Earl of Chatham).
2. Sanchez v. County of San Diego, 464 F.3d 916, 918-19 (9th Cir. 2006).
3. Opening Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 10, Sanchez, 483 F.3d 965 (No. 04-55122).
4. Compare Brief for Appellee at 1, Sanchez, 483 F.3d 965 (No. 04-55122) ("The investigators are not
trying to get an applicant to confess to a crime, but are trying to confirm the applicant's eligibility for
CalWORKs benefits.") with Opening Brief for Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 3, at 4 (stating that the program
is a "systematic invasion[] of the homes of the poor-with free-wheeling inspections of their bedroom closets
and medicine cabinets").
5. Ed Mendel, SD Prime Time, SIGNONSANDIEGO.COM, July 26, 2007, http://weblog.signonsandiego.
com/news/breaking/2007/07/sdprimetime_l .html (transcript on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
6. Colbert Report: Season 3, Episode 3 (Comedy Central television broadcast July 23, 2007) (on file
with the McGeorge Law Review) ("The poor get the basic option package, the right to bear arms .... The
middle class gets a fully loaded Bill of Rights, right to a fair trial, right against self incrimination, even habeas
corpus . . . . And the wealthiest among us get the premium package, options that aren't even in the
Constitution.").
7. Two years after the San Diego program started, the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors
instituted a pilot program based on Project 100%. The Los Angeles program faced legal challenges when
plaintiffs sued in California state court alleging that the home visits were violations of state statutes, regulations,
and the state constitution. See Smith v. L.A. County, 104 Cal. App. 4th 1104, 1110 (2d Dist. 2002) (indicating
that a Los Angeles County Grand Jury investigation examined the San Diego program and recommended that
the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors implement a similar program).
8. California State Senator Tom McClintock authored two bills (SB 786 in the 2005-2006 term as well
as SB 269 in the 2006-2007 term), both of which failed passage in the Senate Human Services Committee. See
SENATE HUMAN SERVICES COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 269, at 3 (Apr. 24, 2007) (noting that
San Diego's program would serve as the "prototype" for the bill).
9. Sanchez v. County of San Diego, 464 F.3d 916, 922-23 (9th Cir. 2006).
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of the Fourth Amendment.' Thus, Fourth Amendment protections would extend
to suspected criminals but not to the rights of law-abiding citizens applying for
public assistance. The appellate court further held that the home visits, had they
in fact been "searches," would have been reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment."
The case sparked passionate points of view on both sides of the issue.'2 When
a majority of the judges from the Ninth Circuit voted to deny rehearing the case
en banc, Judge Pregerson dissented and called the program an "[a]ssault on the
[p]oor."' 3 He further added:
This is especially atrocious in light of the fact that we do not require
similar intrusions into the homes and lives of others who receive
government entitlements. The government does not search through the
closets and medicine cabinets of farmers receiving subsidies. They do
not dig through the laundry baskets and garbage pails of real estate
developers or radio broadcasters. The overwhelming majority of
recipients of government benefits are not the poor, and yet this is the
group we require to sacrifice their dignity and their right to privacy.
14
The plaintiffs petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari, but the Supreme
Court denied review.1
5
This Comment argues that such home visits constitute an unreasonable
search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Proponents of San Diego's
program claim that it serves several important functions: it curbs welfare fraud,
saves limited public funds for the truly needy, and assures integrity in the
system. 6 While these measures arguably serve such purposes, the program does
10. Id. at 931. "[The Supreme Court case of] Wyman ... addresses this very concern and reaches the
opposite conclusion that even though the consequence of refusing a home visit is the denial of benefits, 'the
choice is entirely the applicant's, and nothing of constitutional magnitude is involved."' Id. at 927 n. 15 (quoting
Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 325 (1971) (emphasis in original)).
11. Id. at 931.
12. Compare Editorial, A Loss for Privacy Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2007, at 30 ("It is a fun-house
mirrors version of constitutional analysis for a court to say that government agents are not conducting a search
when they show up unannounced in a person's home and rifle through her bedroom dresser.") with Cully
Stimson, San Diego Prosecutors Devise Welfare Fraud Strategy, Jan. 3, 2008, http://www.foxnews.
com/story/0,2933,320049,00.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) ("These days, you hear lots of folks
talk about the 'right' to this, and the 'right' to that. In most of these cases, there is no constitutional right
involved at all-merely a desire by the speaker to make something a right, usually out of whole cloth.").
13. Sanchez, 483 F.3d at 968 (Pregerson, J., dissenting).
14. Id. at 969.
15. Sanchez v. San Diego County, 128 S. Ct. 649 (2007).
16. See Mortimer B. Zuckerman, Editorial, Showing the Way on Welfare, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
May 22, 1995, at 72 ("Anytime you can reduce the number of people on any public program who aren't
qualified to be on it, [you] bring a sense of integrity, and taxpayers don't feel they are being ripped off."
(quoting President Bill Clinton)).
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so by intruding on the recipients' privacy. 7 The government's purpose of
preserving taxpayer funds for the needy is a laudable goal. However, as Justice
Brandeis noted, "Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect
liberty when the Government's purposes are beneficent."' s
Part II of this Comment reviews the history and legal background of home
visits in public assistance, from last century's "friendly visitor" to the modern-
day "walk through" of District Attorney investigators. Part III analyzes the
reasoning of recent decisions where courts have upheld the validity of welfare
home visits. Part IV argues that home visits qualify as "searches" within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Part IV further argues that the searches are
unreasonable because no recognized exceptions to the Fourth Amendment's
warrant requirements apply. Part V offers possible solutions that would allow the
agencies and courts to adapt to the particular needs involved in the administration
of public assistance. Specifically, this Comment recommends an approach that
requires more individualized suspicion. Such an approach would ensure the
receipt of benefits by those who are eligible and eliminate fraud while respecting
the privacy interests of all welfare recipients.
II. HISTORICAL PRACTICE OF HOME VISITS
A review of the origins of home visits offers context which aids in further
analysis of San Diego's program. Home visits have been part of public assistance
for over a century, but only in the last half of the twentieth century have they
entered the judicial spotlight.'9 Historically, close contact with aid recipients was
20
a regular aspect not only of care but also supervision of the poor.
A. The "Friendly Visitor" and "Mothers' Pensions"
Scientific charity movements of the nineteenth century played an influential
role in the origins of welfare home visits. 2' A volunteer from the movement, what
17. See Sanchez, 483 F.3d at 968 (Pregerson, J., dissenting) ("The government's general interest in
preventing fraud cannot justify such highly intrusive searches of homes where no grounds for suspicion exist.").
18. Parrish v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 66 Cal. 2d 260, 274 n.18 (1967) (citing Olmstead v. United States,
277 U.S. 438,479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
19. See MICHAEL B. KATZ, IN THE SHADOW OF THE POORHOUSE: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF WELFARE IN
AMERICA 58 (10th ed. 1996) (reviewing several charity groups that relied on home visits to distribute aid);
Charles A. Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE L.J. 1245, 1246-
51 (1965) (urging lawyers to take an interest in social welfare including such issues as "morals" and
"independence").
20. See KATZ, supra note 19, at 76 (noting that home visits were an institutional mechanism for
transmitting the values of the city's middle and upper strata downward into the ranks of the poor).
21. JOHN GILLIOM, OVERSEERS OF THE POOR: SURVEILLANCE, RESISTANCE, AND THE LIMITS OF
POVERTY 24 (2001); see KATZ, supra note 19, at 19 (noting that the goals of scientific charity were to abolish
charity known as "outdoor relief' from public view).
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one today might consider a "social worker," visited the recipients' homes.22 The
"friendly visitor" served not only as an adviser but as an investigator as well. 3 As
advisers, charity workers provided assistance to the poor.24 As investigators,
charity workers determined whether recipients were worthy of aid.22
Distinguishing potential recipients into the "deserving" or "undeserving" was
commonplace in such programs. Despite the intrusiveness of home visits, many
recipients preferred the practice because meeting with investigators behind
26
closed doors shielded residents from neighbors' eyes.
The initial purpose behind public assistance was to save society from the
increasing cost of indigent children.27 In 1911, Illinois became the first state to
institute such a system. 28 Known as "Mothers' Pensions," the program distributed
public funds to care for dependent children. It relieved orphanages, foster
homes, or other institutions of the costs associated with caring for these
children. 0 By 1935, all but two states had enacted "Mothers' Pensions" laws.3'
Although the system assisted indigent women to care for their children, the focus
for those distributing aid was less on relief of poverty and more on exclusion of
those deemed undeserving of the aid.32
Many charitable organizations found poverty to be a direct consequence of
individual depravity.33 Moral assumptions have influenced views of the poor, and
those assumptions manifested themselves in conditions placed on aid.34 For
example, laws insisted that the mother provide a "suitable home" for the
children 5 Massachusetts and Michigan provided that a "suitable home" was one
22. GILLIOM, supra note 21, at 24.
23. KATZ, supra note 19, at 76 (explaining the dual relationship of the friendly visitor as "spy" and
"friend").
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. See GILLIOM, supra note 21, at 26 ("[M]any social workers argue that clients preferred home visits,
to protect their privacy against meeting others or being seen by others.").
27. Theda Skocpol et al., Women's Associations and the Enactment of Mothers' Pensions in the United
States, 87 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 686, 686 (1993).
28. Ada J. Davis, The Evolution of the Institution of Mothers' Pensions in the United States, 35 AM. J.
OF Soc. 573, 575 (1930).
29. id.
30. Skocpol et al., supra note 27, at 686.
31. Id.
32. See generally LINDA GORDON, PITIED BuT NOT ENTITLED: SINGLE MOTHERS AND THE HISTORY OF
WELFARE 1890-1935, at 47-48 (1994) (noting that largely white widows were the only ones deemed to be
"worthy" of aid while other ethnic and minority groups were excluded).
33. See KATZ, supra note 19, at 76 (noting that visitors would point out to the poor "the degrading
tendency of a life of dependence and the real dignity of honest work").
34. See Thomas Ross, The Rhetoric of Poverty: Their Immorality, Our Helplessness, 79 GEO. L.J. 1499,
1503 (1990) ("In one fashion or another the poor have always been separated by class distinctions and labels.
They have been labeled, 'paupers,' 'peasants,' and 'strangers.' They have been cast as different, deviant, and
morally weak. These assumptions make coherent the physical separation of the poor from the affluent.").
35. GILLIOM, supra note 21, at 25 (noting that both Massachusetts and Michigan prohibited male
boarders while other states mandated that the religious upbringing of the child be protected).
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without male boarders and one that protected the religious upbringing of the
child.36 Home visits and personal interaction served to distinguish the suitable
homes from the non-suitable." The "friendly visitor," serving as investigator, was
an invaluable tool in that determination.
B. The Social Security Act of 1935 and Beyond
As the demand for public assistance grew during the Great Depression,
program administrators continued to rely on home visits to ensure that aid was
going only to those who were eligible. 8 The federal government responded to
increased poverty by passing the Social Security Act of 1935.' 9 The legislation
created programs designed to address social welfare. 0 The Social Security Act of
1935 included the Aid to Dependent Children (ADC) program, which adopted
most of the provisions previously enumerated in the "Mothers' Pensions" laws.4'
Thus, local practices largely remained in place; chief among them was the
assumption that "a public assistance client was in need of counseling and
rehabilitation and had fewer privacy rights than others. 42
Home visits continued to serve as the chief investigative tool-the most
effective way to determine whether the home was "suitable., 43 "Man in the
house" or "substitute father" rules prohibited any payment to "children of a
mother who 'cohabitat[ed]' in or outside her home with any single or married
able-bodied man." 44 Vague definitions of "substitute fathers" encouraged
caseworkers to conduct invasive interviews in which they probed the most
intimate details of recipients' personal lives, making the welfare process "'a
humiliating and dehumanizing ordeal.' 45 The private life of the recipient was
36. Id.
37. KATZ, supra note 19, at 76.
38. GILLIOM, supra note 21, at 25; see Joel F. Handler, "Ending Welfare As We Know It, ": The Win/Win
Spin or the Stench of Victory, 5 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 131, 134 (2001) (explaining that eligibility for
benefits centered on distinguishing between those who were "unable to care for themselves" and the "able-
bodied").
39. See Social Security Act, ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620 (1935) (codified as 42 U.S.C. ch. 7) (setting aside
funds to enable states to furnish financial assistance to needy children).
40. GILLIOM, supra note 21, at 25.
41. Id. at 26.
42. GORDON, supra note 32, at 296.
43. Jonathan L. Hafetz, A Man's Home Is His Castle: Reflections on the Home, the Family, and Privacy
During the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries, 8 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 175, 220-21
(2001).
44. King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 311 (1968); see also Hafetz, supra note 43, at 224-25. Contra id. at
333 (holding a state's substitute father regulation inconsistent with the meaning of "parent" under the Social
Security Act).
45. Hafetz, supra note 43, at 225 (quoting Susan B. Bennett, "No Relief But Upon the Terms of Coming
into the House "-Controlled Spaces, Invisible Disentitlements, and Homelessness in an Urban Shelter System,
104 YALE L.J. 2157, 2186 (1995)).
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always under scrutiny; mothers routinely had to answer questions regarding
sexual behavior or witness investigators interrogate their children. 46
C. Legal Background
In the last half of the twentieth century, as participation in public assistance
grew and government expenditures increased, demands to enforce the
distribution of aid increased as well.47  Legal scholars created a national
movement that sought to represent the interests of the poor.4 ' A broader spectrum
of citizens started to receive public assistance: divorced women, deserted women,
never-married women, and people of color all took a share of assistance.49 One
commentator argues that this broader base of participation led to the proclaimed
"crisis" in welfare. ° During the 1960s and 1970s, the federal government took a
firmer stance, seeking to stem the increasing costs in the system.51
1. Midnight Raids and Parrish
States stepped up the intrusiveness of the home visits; investigators
conducted unannounced home searches, frequently at night.52 In 1967, the
California Supreme Court ruled that such searches were an unconstitutional
infringement of the recipients' Fourth Amendment rights. 3 In Parrish v. Civil
Service Commission, the Alameda County Board of Supervisors directed a series
46. FRANCES Fox PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, REGULATING THE POOR: THE FUNCTIONS OF
PUBLIC WELFARE 166 (1971).
47. Hafetz, supra note 43, at 225; see Timothy J. Casey & Mary R. Mannix, Quality Control in Public
Assistance: Victimizing the Poor Through One-Sided Accountability, 22 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1381, 1382
(1989) ("The average monthly number of families receiving AFDC more than tripled, from one million in 1965
to three and one-half million in 1975."). Cf. Ross, supra note 34, at 1504-05 ("Many American communities in
the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries concluded that even the burden of providing assistance to
members of the community had become too great .... The solution was to purge the undeserving poor from the
system of public assistance.").
48. See generally Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 270-71 (1970) (granting procedural due process
rights to welfare recipient faced with termination of benefits); Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE
L.J. 733 (1964) (proposing that government-created entitlements, such as welfare assistance, amount to
property, not charity).
49. In fact, ADC only furnished support for the needs of the children; it was not until 1962 that
caretakers were included and the name of the program changed to Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC). See Handler, supra note 38, at 135-36 ("In streamed the previously excluded-African-Americans, the
divorced, the separated, the deserted, and the never-married.").
50. Handler, supra note 38, at 135-36.
51. Id.; see also Casey & Mannix, supra note 47, at 1382 (noting that the Nixon administration's
stringent "Quality Control" measures attempted, albeit unsuccessfully, to sanction states that made
overpayments greater than the federal government's "tolerance" level).
52. See generally Charles A. Reich, Midnight Searches and the Social Security Act, 72 YALE L.J. 1347
(1962) (a major voice in welfare advocacy, Reich analyzed the growing trend of unannounced searches at night
designed to apprehend unaccounted-for males residing in the applicant's home).
53. Parrish v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 66 Cal. 2d 260, 267 (1967).
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of early dawn raids on the homes of welfare recipients in hopes of finding
"unauthorized males., 54 Welfare officials began the raids, known as "Operation
Bedcheck," at 6:30 in the morning 5 Parrish, a welfare agency employee, refused
to participate, and the agency fired him. He sought to be reinstated, claiming that
he acted reasonably in not following the unconstitutional demands of his
superiors. The Parrish court addressed the constitutionality of the searches to
determine whether Parrish had reasonable grounds for his refusal. The California
Supreme Court held that the suspicionless searches and the manner in which they
were conducted violated the welfare recipients' Fourth Amendment right to be
secure in their homes.56
2. The Supreme Court Approves of Welfare Home Visits
Wyman v. James" was the seminal decision in validating home visits as a
condition of receiving welfare benefits.58 Mrs. James and her infant son resided in
New York City.5 9 Shortly before her son's birth, Mrs. James applied for public
assistance. 6° New York's Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)
program required home visits to determine applicant eligibility.6' When she first
applied for the aid, a caseworker entered Mrs. James' home, conducted a visit,
and confirmed her eligibility.62 Two years later, Mrs. James refused the
caseworker's request to enter the home.63 The agency terminated Mrs. James'
public assistance. She challenged the program and argued that the mandatory
home visit violated her Fourth Amendment rights.64
Justice Blackmun's majority opinion for the Court delivered to welfare
advocates what one scholar termed a "double-barrel" blow. 6' First, the Court
ruled that the agency's home visit did not constitute a "search" under the Fourth
Amendment.66 The applicant's unfettered choice to deny consent with no criminal
54. Id. at 263, & n.2 (describing an "unauthorized male" as any "adult male 'assuming the role of
spouse' to the child's mother, whether married to her or not").
55. Id. at 263.
56. Id. at 274 ("Even if we were to assume that a public demonstration of the contemplated type might
tend to further the purposes of the welfare program, any such speculative benefit must yield before the far more
immediate and substantial right of innocent persons to be secure in their homes.").
57. 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
58. Allison I. Brown, Privacy Issues Affecting Welfare Applicants, 35 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 421, 422-
23 (2001).
59. Wyman, 400 U.S. at 313.
60. Id.
61. ld. at 313, 320.
62. Id. at 313.
63. Id.
64. ld. at 309.
65. Ross, supra note 34, at 1523 (1991).
66. Wyman, 400 U.S. at 318.
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consequences played a role in whether to apply Fourth Amendment safeguards.67
Since the applicant's denial of a caseworker's visit would result in nothing more
than denial of aid, there was no criminal context in which to find a "search. 68
The caseworker would not force his or her way into the home, nor would the
caseworker seek a warrant to mandate entry.69 In the Court's view, "[t]here is no
entry of the home and there is no search."7° Therefore, removed from any
criminal context, the government action lay outside the scope of the Fourth
Amendment.7'
Second, the Court ruled that had the visits been considered searches, they
would not be "unreasonable" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.72
The Court enumerated eleven reasons why it believed the searches "did not
descend to the level of unreasonableness."73 Following the analysis in Terry v.
Ohio,74 the Court mentioned, "'the specific content and incidents of [the Fourth
Amendment] right must be shaped by the context in which it is asserted.' '7 The
Court then listed the factors it used to find that the visits were not unreasonable:
(1) the state's paramount interest in the welfare and protection of the child;7 6 (2)
the state's assurance that the beneficiaries of aid are the intended objects; (3) the
public's interest in knowing how its funds are utilized; (4) the caseworker's close
contact with the beneficiary that leads to "strengthening family life" and
"maxim[izing] self-support"; (5) the history of the home visit as the "heart" of
welfare administration; (6) the minimal "burden" on the recipient; (7) Mrs.
James' lack of specific allegations of intrusion; (8) the welfare agency's lack of
alternative practical means to obtain eligibility information; (9) the
characteristics of the actor conducting the search as a "caseworker of some
training"; (10) the fact that the visit did not constitute a criminal investigation;
and (11) the inapplicability and adversarial nature of the warrant procedure.77 The
Court did not indicate which factors it weighted most heavily, but peppered the
factors with language referring to the "gentle means" of the visitation as well as
its "personal, rehabilitative orientation. 78
67. Id. at 317-18 ("If consent to the visitation is withheld, no visitation takes place. The aid then never
begins or merely ceases, as the case may be. There is no entry of the home and there is no search.").
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 317.
72. Id. at 318.
73. Id.
74. 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968).
75. Wyman, 400 U.S. at 318 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968)).
76. Id. But see Ross, supra note 34, at 1524-25 (arguing that such an assumption that the mother would
act contrary to the interests of her child "would offend any mother and would be an unlikely premise in the
societal rhetoric outside the context of welfare and poverty").
77. Wyman, 400 U.S. at 318-24.
78. Id. at 319-20.
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The Court's holding narrowly addressed the visits under New York statutes,
and distinguished the early morning raids of Parrish]9 The Court noted, "Our
holding today does not mean, of course, that a termination of benefits upon
refusal of a home visit is to be upheld against constitutional challenge under all
conceivable circumstances. "80
3. Post-Wyman Decisions
Courts have relied on Wyman to determine the legality of home visits.8 Two
decisions from lower courts illustrate how courts distinguish and follow Wyman. In
Reyes v. Edmunds,82 a Minnesota district court invalidated a mobile fraud
enforcement unit that conducted surprise investigations at the homes of public
assistance recipients." The government contended that the searches were valid
because the recipients had consented, and the searches were in a "social," not
"criminal," context." The district court further added, "[n]o one will contend that the
duty and trust imposed upon the Welfare Department to assure that public funds are
expended properly is not of great significance and fraught with practical difficulties.
But the integrity of financial assistance programs must be preserved only by utilizing
reasonable administrative procedures.""
On the other hand, S.L. v. Whitburn8 followed Wyman's holding that home visits
were not "searches" and thus did not constitute a violation of Fourth Amendment
rights.87 In Whitburn, aid recipients challenged a Milwaukee program's procedures
authorizing welfare home visits.88 The Whitburn court used Wyman to question the
plaintiffs' grievances and quoted the opinion to ask whether the recipients were
seeking "to utilize the Fourth Amendment as a wedge ... to avoid questions of any
kind."8 9 The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals referred to Wyman as "nothing more
than a concrete application of the well established principle that 'the legitimacy of
certain privacy expectations vis-a-vis the State may depend upon the individual's
relationship with the State.' 90 This reasoning echoed justifications for the "friendly
79. Id. at 325 ("Facts of that kind present another case for another day.").
80. Id. at 326 (emphasis added).
81. See Sanchez v. County of San Diego, 464 F.3d 916, 921 (9th Cir. 2006) ("Wyman directly controls
the instant case."); Smith v. L.A. County, 104 Cal. App. 4th 1104, 1122 (2d Dist. 2002) (noting that its
conclusion was consistent with Wyman); S.L. v. Whitbum, 67 F.3d 1299, 1307 (7th Cir. 1995) ("we are bound
by Wyman."); Reyes v. Edmunds, 472 F. Supp. 1218, 1223 (D. Minn. 1979) (referring to Wyman as the
"definitive word" on the administration of welfare home visits).
82. 472 F. Supp. 1218 (D. Minn. 1979).
83. Id. at 1230.
84. Id. at 1225.
85. Id. at 1226 (emphasis added).
86. 67 F.3d 1299.
87. Id. at 1307.
88. Id. at 1301.
89. Id. at 1309-10.
90. Id. at 1310 (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 654 (1995)) (analogizing the
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visitor" from the earliest era of public assistance, where the need for "rehabilitation"
of the poor necessitated a diminished expectation of privacy. 9'
D. The Modem Era: Federal and State Welfare Reforms
In 1996, the age of welfare entitlement came to an end.92 Congress passed the
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996
(PRWORA),93 ending the cash assistance program, AFDC, and creating the
Temporary Assistance to Needy Families Act (TANF).94 State authority over welfare
increased with TANF's block grants from the federal government to the states.95
However, the federal government placed a five-year limit on the receipt of welfare.96
The California legislature created the California Work Opportunity and
Responsibility to Kids Act (CalWORKs), a cash assistance as well as job-training
program.97 The counties administer CalWORKs under the supervision of the
California Department of Social Services (DSS), and DSS policies and procedures
control the administration of welfare programs.98 Policies and procedures of the DSS
do allow for home visits, but such visits must be made "during reasonable hours of
normal family activity," and cannot "infringe upon [the applicant's] constitutional
rights."99 These constitutional rights have been the subject of two class action
lawsuits in California.
III. SMITH AND SANCHEZ: REINVIGORATING WYMAN AND
TURNING TO "SPECIAL NEEDS"
California has served as the backdrop for this era's litigation regarding the
constitutionality of home visits. While San Diego's Project 100% originated in
1997, a similar program in Los Angeles County spawned the first litigation. '°°
"relationship" that welfare recipients have with the state to that of student athletes in Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v.
Acton, 515 U.S. at 658).
91. See GORDON, supra note 32, at 296 ("[A] public assistance client was in need of counseling and
rehabilitation and had fewer privacy rights that others.").
92. See Handler, supra note 38, at 131-32 (noting the work requirements and time limits established by
TANF and PRWORA).
93. Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996).
94. Id.
95. See Handler, supra note 38, at 135-36.
96. 42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(7) (West 2008).
97. See 1997 Cal. Stat. AB 1542, Ch. 270 (enacting and amending multiple sections of the California
Education Code, Government Code, Health and Safety Code, Public Utilities Code, Unemployment Insurance
Code, and the Welfare and Institutions Code); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 11200 (West 2001) ("This chapter
shall be known.., as the California Work Opportunity and Responsibility to Kids Act . .
98. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 10550, 10553.1 (West 2001 & Supp. 2008).
99. CAL. DEP'T OF SOC. SERV., MANUAL OF POLICIES AND PROCEDURES § 20-007.33.
100. See Smith v. L.A. County Bd. of Supervisors, 104 Cal. App. 4th 1104, 1112 (2d Dist. 2002) (noting
that plaintiffs challenged the program in September 1999).
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This Part reviews the decisions in both the California state courts and federal
courts. Smith mirrors Sanchez in its use of the "special needs" exception to the
requirements of the Fourth Amendment.
A. Smith v. Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors0'
The Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors changed its welfare program
after a television broadcast about welfare fraud.' 2 Following an investigation, a
Los Angeles grand jury recommended a plan that would serve to combat welfare
fraud. 10 3 The Board of Supervisors instituted a pilot plan that included a home
visitation program modeled after that of Project 100%.'04 By Los Angeles
County's estimates, the home visits saved 4.3 million dollars.0 5 Despite the fact
that only 2.5 percent of the visits resulted in ineligibility, the savings were said to
be "significant."'' 6 The plaintiffs sued the Board of Supervisors in California state
court to halt the program as a violation of their state and federal constitutional
rights. 07
The Smith court held that the Los Angeles County program was
constitutional.' 0 The court questioned whether the Los Angeles County welfare
agency visits were "searches" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.' 09 It
further argued that the "special needs" doctrine, "a rapidly expanding area of
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence," applied as well."0 The administration of
welfare benefits presented a "special need" beyond that of mere law
enforcement."' The court held that the government's interest in reducing welfare
fraud balanced against the minimal intrusion of the home did not render the
search "unreasonable" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
112
101. Id.
102. Id at 1110. But see FRANKLIN D. GILLIAM, THE "WELFARE QUEEN" EXPERIMENT: How VIEWERS
REACT TO IMAGES OF AFRICAN AMERICAN MOTHERS ON WELFARE 2 (1999), available at http://repositories.
cdlib.org/ccc/media/007 (conducting an experiment to demonstrate that the public's perceptions of and hostility
toward welfare are often misshaped by the images they see on news broadcasts).
103. Smith, 104 Cal. App. 4th at 1110.
104. Id.
105. Id.atl113.
106. Id. But cf. LOS ANGELES COUNTY CHILDREN AND FAMILIES BUDGET, FISCAL YEAR 2002-03, at 6,
available at http:/lacounty.info/LACChildrenAndFamBudget_2002-03.pdf (noting that the Los Angeles
County Department of Social Services budget is over $1.96 billion).
107. Smith, 104 Cal. App. 4th at 1109 (the plaintiffs also raised alleged violations of DSS policies and
procedures).
108. Id. at 1123.
109. Id. at 1120.
110. Id. at 1120-21.
111. See id. at 1121 ("[Tlhe government has a substantial interest in assuring that the aid goes to those
truly eligible for the benefit.").
112. Id. at 1122-23.
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B. Sanchez v. County of San Diego"3
By the time the California Court of Appeal decided Smith, litigation in
Sanchez was already under way." 4 The three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals divided; the dissent distinguished Wyman, while the majority
held that Wyman controlled the outcome."5 Like the Smith court, the Sanchez
court analyzed the welfare home visit program by looking at how the program
was conducted." 6 The plaintiffs argued that the program resembled the dawn
raids in Parrish and that these were not the rehabilitative visits seen in Wyman."
7
The Board of Supervisors insisted that the program was merely a "walk through,"
conducted with the proper notice to the aid recipient and operated during regular
daytime hours." 8 The Board stressed that recipients consented to the visits and
that no single person had been brought forward on criminal charges based on
evidence uncovered in any home visits." 9 The majority followed Wyman, thus
precluding any Fourth Amendment analysis; it held that welfare home visits do
not qualify as "searches" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.1
20
C. Turning to "Special Needs"
Sanchez, like Smith, did not end its analysis with reliance on Wyman. In
dicta, the court employed the "special needs" doctrine, a recognized exception to
the Fourth Amendment, to substantiate the validity of the visits. '2'
1. Origins of "Special Needs": T.L.O. and Griffin
The "special needs" doctrine has presented considerable challenges for the
Supreme Court, and scholars approach the exception cautiously.122 The "special
needs" doctrine first appeared in Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion in New
113. 464 F.3d 916 (9th Cir. 2006), reh'g denied, 483 F.3d 965 (9th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct.
649 (2007).
114. See Opening Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 7, Sanchez, 483 F.3d 965 (explaining that plaintiffs
sought an injunction against the program in late 2001).
115. Sanchez, 464 F.3d at 920-21, 931-32.
116. Id. at 919.
117. See id. at 929 (noting that boader protection is provided under Parrish).
118. Id. at 930.
119. Id. at 924 n.12, 925.
120. Id. at 925-28.
121. Id.; Smith v. L.A. County Bd. of Supervisors, 104 Cal. App. 4th 1104, 1120-22 (2d Dist. 2002).
122. See Jennifer Y. Buffaloe, "Special Needs" and the Fourth Amendment: An Exception Poised to
Swallow the Warrant Preference Rule, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 529, 531-32 (1997) (arguing that the
assumption that only peripheral values to the Fourth Amendment are implicated in searches outside the
traditional criminal context is wrong); Steven R. Probst, Case Comment, Ferguson v. City of Charleston: Slowly
Returning the "Special Needs" Doctrine to Its Roots, 36 VAL. U. L. REv. 285 (2001) (analyzing the Supreme
Court's changing analysis).
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Jersey v. T.L.O. 231 In T.L.O., a school teacher walked into the girls' restroom and
witnessed two girls smoking, a violation of school rules.' 24 The teacher brought
the girls to the principal's office.' 25 There, T.L.O. denied smoking at all, at which
time the principal searched her bag and discovered a bag of marijuana.' 26 The
majority opinion turned to the reasonableness of the search under the
circumstances, balancing the interests at stake; it determined that the school's
interest in maintaining order outweighed the student's expectation of privacy.
27
Justice Blackmun concurred that the "special needs" of the school justified a
departure from the typical Fourth Amendment warrant requirement.' 28 He only
sought to add school searches to the growing list of Fourth Amendment
exceptions; however, "T.L.O. has come to be cited for the proposition that the
warrant and probable cause requirements are excused anytime special needs
exist."
129
Two years later, the Supreme Court formally adopted the "special needs"
doctrine in Griffin v. Wisconsin."3 In Griffin, the authorities searched a
probationer's home, where they uncovered an illegally possessed weapon.'3 ' The
probationer challenged the search as a violation of the Fourth Amendment. 3 2 The
Court ruled that the county had a "special need" in the supervision of the persons
in its probation system, and that there were circumstances other than mere law
enforcement where obtaining a search warrant would be impracticable. 33 The
Court justified the intrusion into the probationer's home on the basis that a
probationer's "relationship" with the state results in a reduced expectation of
privacy.34 Justice Scalia explained that the probationer is under certain
"restrictions" that are "meant to assure that the probation serves as a period of
genuine rehabilitation.'' 35
123. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) ("Only in those exceptional circumstances in
which special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause
requirement impracticable, is a court entitled to substitute its balancing of interests for that of the Framers.").
124. Id. at 328.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 339-40.
128. Id. at 353 (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("The special need for an immediate response to behavior that
threatens either the safety of schoolchildren and teachers or the educational process itself justifies the Court in
excepting school searches from the warrant and probable-cause requirement, and in applying a standard
determined by balancing the relevant interests.").
129. Buffaloe, supra note 122, at 538.
130. 483 U.S. 868 (1987).
131. Id. at 868.
132. Id. at 872.
133. Id. at 875-76.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 875.
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Sanchez found that the relationship a probationer has with the state is similar
to that of a welfare recipient. 136 The court extended the "special needs" doctrine
to other areas, but Smith and Sanchez are arguably the first courts to find that the
wholesale administration of public assistance presents a "special need."
IV. ANALYSIS
The Fourth Amendment provides for the "right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures."'37 Searches conducted without a warrant are per se unreasonable unless
a recognized exception applies.'38 In Sanchez, welfare home "walk throughs"
were not considered "searches" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment;
therefore, the court was not required to employ a recognized exception.
39
Section A of this Part analyzes whether "walk through" home visits should
be viewed as "searches" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
Assuming that they are "searches," one must determine whether any recognized
exceptions apply. 40 The subsequent three sections of this Part address possible
exceptions and argue that such exceptions are insufficient to overcome the
warrant requirement. 14,
A. The Meaning of Search
The Supreme Court has held that privacy interests in the home are "at the
very core" of the Fourth Amendment. 42 Such protection afforded to the interests
of the individual in the home should apply to welfare home visits as well.1
4
1
136. See Sanchez v. County of San Diego, 464 F.3d 916, 927 (9th Cir. 2006) (using Griffin to illustrate
that "a person's relationship with the state can reduce that person's expectation of privacy even within the
sanctity of the home").
137. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
138. 68 AM. JUR. 2D Searches & Seizures § 12 (2000); see Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 372
(1993) ("Time and again, this Court has observed that searches and seizures "'conducted outside the judicial
process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-
subject only to a few specifically established and well delineated exceptions."' (quoting Thompson v.
Louisiana, 469 U.S. 19-20 (1984))); Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006) ("It is a 'basic principle
of Fourth Amendment law that searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively
unreasonable."' (quoting Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 559 (2004))); Brigham, 547 U.S. at 403 ("[B]ecause
the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is 'reasonableness,' the warrant requirement is subject to
certain exceptions." (quoting Flippo v. West Virginia, 528 U.S. 11, 13 (1999))).
139. See Sanchez, 464 F.3d at 922-23 (stating that because the home visits do not constitute searches,
the court need not resolve the Fourth Amendment issue).
140. See infra Part IV.A.1-3.
141. See infra Part IV.B.1-3.
142. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001) (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505,
511 (1961)); Payton v. New York 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1979) ("[T]he Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line
at the entrance to the house.").
143. Sanchez v. County of San Diego, 483 F.3d 965, 969 (9th Cir. 2007) (mem.) (Pregerson, J.,
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However, the visits do not qualify as "searches" because courts have followed
the precedent in Wyman and precluded Fourth Amendment issues raised in the
context of welfare administration.' 44 Yet welfare home visits, as seen in Sanchez,
are fundamentally different from the home visits of the 1970s seen in Wyman.'
Home visits have become less "rehabilitative" and unlike the "gentle means" or
"personal" aspects of the visits in Wyman, today's investigators conducting the
welfare home visit do not offer services or assistance to the recipient. 14 6 Not only
has the character of welfare home visits changed, but also the character of home
privacy interests has changed. 4 1 While this Comment does not address
substantive due process, the Court has extended Fourteenth Amendment
protection into home life.4 4 Given these changes, the judicial view toward
modem welfare investigation should adjust accordingly.
Here, the Fourth Amendment analysis must initially address whether welfare
home visits constitute a "search" within the scope of the Fourth Amendment.' 49
The plain meaning of a search is defined as "[a]n examination of a person's
body, property or other area that the person would reasonably be expected to
consider as private, conducted by a law-enforcement officer for the purpose of
finding evidence of a crime."'5 This definition reveals three possible areas of
inquiry. First, the location must be an area "reasonably expected to [be]
consider[ed] as private. Second, the actor conducting the search should, but
dissenting).
144. See Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 318 (1971) (explaining that in the event of the recipient's
refusal, there is "no entry of the home and there is no search"); Sanchez, 464 F.3d at 922-23 ("[B]ecause we are
bound by Wyman, we conclude that the Project 100% home visits do not qualify as searches within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment."); see also S.L. v. Whitbum, 67 F.3d 1299, 1307 (7th Cir. 1995) (applying the
Wyman decision to hold that the home visits are not searches); Smith v. L.A. County, 104 Cal. App. 4th 1104,
1120 (2002) (giving "great weight" to a Department of Social Services determination that home visits were not
fraud investigations and thus holding that the visits were not searches).
145. Sanchez, 464 F.3d at 934 (Fisher, J., dissenting).
146. Opening Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 15-16, Sanchez, 464 F.3d 916 (No. 04-55122).
147. See Sanchez, 464 F.3d at 936 (Fisher, J., dissenting) (noting how the character of the visits is solely
to provide for eligibility requirements).
148. See generally Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (holding that the right of intimate
association is protected under the Constitution); Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977)
("This Court has long recognized that freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life is one
of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." (quoting Cleveland Bd. of
Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974))); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (holding that
individuals have a right of privacy in decisions to have a child).
149. The court in Sanchez acknowledged that changes in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence since
Wyman v. James might call into question the reasoning from Wyman, that home visits were not searches.
However, the court followed Angostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 237 (1997), which required appellate courts to
follow precedent if "direct application" was necessary. Sanchez, 464 F.3d at 920.
150. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1377 (8th ed. 2004); see Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001)
("[A] Fourth Amendment search does not occur ... unless 'the individual manifested a subjective expectation
of privacy in the object of the challenged search,' and 'society [is] willing to recognize that expectation as
reasonable."' (citing California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 221 (1986))).
151. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1377 (8th ed. 2004); see also 68 AM. JUR. 2D Searches & Seizures §
16 (2000) ("[l]f an inspection by the police does not intrude upon a legitimate expectation of privacy, there is no
'search' subject to the warrant clause of the Fourth Amendment."); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351
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need not exclusively, be a "law enforcement officer."'5 2 Third, the purpose of a
search must be to find "evidence of a crime."' 5 3 Analysis of these three aspects of
the government action in Sanchez reveals that welfare home visits qualify as
searches within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
1. Location of the Search. The Sanctity of the Home
Common-law history, Constitutional history, and Supreme Court precedent
all respect the heightened protection of the home from government intrusion.'
5 4
The maxim dictates that a "man's home is his castle," and the plain language of
the Fourth Amendment protects the rights of people in their "houses, papers, and
effects."' 55 Further evidence of the framers' intent to protect the home may be
found in the Third Amendment, which prohibits the quartering of any soldier in a
"house" without the owner's consent.' 6 "The common-law felony of burglary
also demonstrat[es] the unique status of the house."'5 7 Most recently, in Kyllo v.
United States, the Court held that the government conducted a search where
federal agents used a thermal imaging device to detect heat emanating from a
garage housing marijuana plants.'58 Reversing the judgment of the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals, Justice Scalia took what he called the "long view" of the
Fourth Amendment in stating that it "draws a firm line at the entrance to the
house."' 59 The Court noted that "[i]n the home, our cases show, all details are
intimate details, because the entire area is held safe from prying government
eyes."' 6
(1967) ("[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly exposes to the public
• .. is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what he seeks to preserve as private ... may be
constitutionally protected."); Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 771 (1983) ("If the inspection by police does not
intrude upon a legitimate expectation of privacy, there is no 'search' subject to the Warrant Clause.").
152. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1377 (8th ed. 2004); see New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 335
(1985) (acknowledging that while Fourth Amendment has focused on police action, other government officials
have been subject to Fourth Amendment restraints as well).
153. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1377 (8th ed. 2004); see Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 32 n.l
(2001) (noting that the Fourth Amendment originally meant "to look over and through for the purpose of
finding something"). But see New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 335 (1985) ("Because the individual's
interest in privacy and personal security 'suffers whether the government's motivation is to investigate
violations of criminal laws or breaches of other statutory or regulatory standards,' it would be 'anomalous to say
that the individual and his private property are fully protected by the Fourth Amendment only when the
individual is suspected of criminal behavior."' (quoting Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 312-13 (1978)
and Camara v. Mun. Ct., 387 U.S 523, 530 (1967) respectively)).
154. See New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14, 17 (1990) ("[Olur holding in [Payton] stemmed from the
'overriding respect for the sanctity of the home that has been embedded in our traditions since the origins of the
Republic."' (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 601 (1980))).
155. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
156. See Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 547, 642
n.259 (1999) (noting that the Third Amendment was based on a provision in the English Bill of Rights).
157. Id.
158. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 29-30.
159. Id. at 40 (quoting Payton, 445 U.S. at 590).
160. Id. at 37.
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The mere location of the government action in Sanchez should increase the
judicial inquiry on these visits. 1 6' However, Sanchez denied this protection.
Investigators searched through the most intimate areas of the recipient's home
looking for signs of fraud. 61 Officers searched medicine cabinets, laundry
baskets, and closets. 63 However, the Court's rationale in Kyllo that the home
deserves maximum protection from even the most minimal intrusion, suggests
that even the most reserved "walk through" would surely trigger Fourth
Amendment safeguards. 164
Therefore, the location of the government action in Sanchez suggests that the
action is a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
2. The Government Actor: Rehabilitative Caseworker vs. Investigative Law-
Enforcement Officer
The second criterion in determining whether a "search" has occurred is
examining the type of actor conducting the government action. In Wyman, social
workers conducted the interview in the recipients' home. 65 The Court gave these
caseworkers the opportunity to conduct "rehabilitative" visits. 6 6 In describing the
phrase "assistance and rehabilitation," the Court noted that federal statutes did
not differ from the state statutes. 16 7 Those statutes emphasized the "close contact"
with the recipient in order to "restor[e] the aid recipient 'to a condition of self-
support' .... ,,6 The focus was on the "relief of [the recipient's] distress."
169
In Sanchez, trained law enforcement officials from the District Attorney's
office, as opposed to an agency caseworker with social work training, conducted
the home visits. 7 0 This is a critical difference because it changed the nature of the
visit-transforming welfare home visits into a mere means to verify eligibility.171
Unlike Wyman, the visits no longer serve the welfare recipient but rather the
161. See Hafetz, supra note 43, at 180 n.23 ("So great moreover is the regard of the law for private
property that it will not authorize the least violation of it; no, not even for the general good of the community."
(quoting 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 139)).
162. Sanchez v. County of San Diego, 464 F.3d 916, 919 (9th Cir. 2006).
163. Id. at 936 (Fisher, J., dissenting).
164. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40 (explaining that while the defendant might not have had any "significant"
compromise of privacy, the court relied on the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment-a bright-line rule
barring entry of the house).
165. Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 318, 323 (1971).
166. Id. at 322-23 ("[The visit] is made by a caseworker of some training whose primary objective is, or
should be, the welfare, not the prosecution, of the aid recipient for whom the worker has profound
responsibility.").
167. Id. at 319.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Sanchez v. County of San Diego, 464 F.3d 916, 935 (9th Cir. 2006) (Fisher, J., dissenting).
171. See id. at 924.
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program itself. 72 The court equated the role of law enforcement investigators
with social caseworkers thereby undercutting the importance of rehabilitation, a
hallmark of social work.
17 3
Social workers, unlike fraud investigators, bring value to the recipient of any
home visit. 114 Wyman underscored the potential benefit of a caseworker's home visit
in its ability to recognize troublesome issues and to help the recipient achieve a self-
supporting lifestyle.175 Social work is its own profession, and it plays a vital role for
recipients of welfare.'76 The ability of trained caseworkers to recognize their duty to
serve the client has allowed judicial deference to their role in home visits.'77 At the
district court level in Wyman, the dissenting judge argued for the validity of home
visits and referred to the relationship between recipient and caseworker as one "based
upon mutual confidence and trust.' s78 The nature of the relationship relates to
whether the government's action should be categorized as a "search."
To replace the caseworkers' rehabilitative function with law enforcement
officers who ensure legal compliance denies caseworkers the opportunity to serve
their function.' 79 The behavior of the investigators in Sanchez shows that the
recipients of assistance receive little value from the visits. When the plaintiffs'
counsel asked one of the investigators about his duties, the investigator responded
that the duties of the investigation team specifically excluded rehabilitation. In his
deposition, he said, "[a]nd I'm trying to envision what rehabilitation would be under
those circumstances. Get off the couch. Get a job. I don't know.... I don't envision
rehabilitation as part of that. I can't even imagine what that would look like.' ' 8
172. See JOHN H. EHRENREICH, THE ALTRUISTIC IMAGINATION: A HISTORY OF SOCIAL WORK AND
SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 9 (1985) (stressing the importance of serving the individuals on
welfare).
173. See Sanchez, 464 F.3d at 935-36 (Fisher, J., dissenting) ("[T]he county's program requires fraud
investigators with no expertise in social work and no object of rehabilitating the applicant to detect and report
evidence of welfare fraud and other crimes."); EHRENREICH, supra note 172, at 9 (noting that social work
involves closely working with clients to assess and improve impediments to progress).
174. Note, Rehabilitation, Investigation and the Welfare Home Visit, 79 YALE L.J. 746, 751-52 (1970)
("If there is no evidence of fraud or ineligibility during a home visit, however, the caseworker has nevertheless
provided needed services for her client.").
175. See Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 318, 319-20 (1971) ("But it has been noted that the visit is the
'heart of welfare administration'; that it affords 'a personal rehabilitative orientation, unlike that of most federal
programs'...." (quoting Rehabilitation, Investigation and the Welfare Home Visit, supra note 174, at 748)).
176. See EHRENREICH, supra note 172, at 9 ("Social work serves as a key mediator between virtually all
other professions and their clients and between a wide variety of bureaucratic institutions and the people they
serve.").
177. See Rehabilitation, Investigation and the Welfare Home Visit, supra note 174, at 752 ("The entire
rationale for judicial deference depends upon the initial assumption that the caseworker is acting in the best
interests of her client."). But see JAMES L. PAYNE, OVERCOMING WELFARE: EXPECTING MORE FROM THE POOR
AND FROM OURSELVES 78-81 (1998) (indicating that caseworkers are often aware of fraud but hesitate to report
it because agency goals conflict with service goals).
178. James v. Goldberg, 303 F. Supp. 935, 946 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (McLean, J., dissenting).
179. See EHRENREICH, supra note 172, at 55 (describing how the role of caseworker visitation was a
means of developing the trust of the poor).
180. Opening Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 15-16, Sanchez v. County of San Diego, 464 F.3d 916
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On the other hand, proponents of welfare home visits point to the
professionalism of the investigators as a safeguard of the recipients'
constitutional rights.18 In an article published one year after the program's
inception, the author, then a San Diego Deputy District Attorney, described an
investigator: "[He] loves his job and does it with a personable, courteous
demeanor.... But [the investigator] and his colleagues understand the bounds of
their duties-to vigorously investigate welfare fraud while assiduously respecting
the rights of the recipients."'8 2 Apart from legal compliance, there is no mention
of serving the interests of the recipient. As agents of the government who seek
recipient compliance, investigators should be subject to the Fourth Amendment.
In Sanchez, the majority and the dissent criticized one another for
mischaracterizing the importance of the identity of the officials conducting the
search.'83 The dissent pointed to the California law defining District Attorney
officials as "law enforcement."'8 4 The majority found the dissent's analysis
misplaced; it pointed to New York v. Burger '85 where even uniformed police
officers were found to have conducted a valid search.8 6 However, as discussed
below in section C of this Part, that precedent is readily distinguishable. 87
In sum, the identity of the government actor plays a role in determining
whether an action should be viewed as a search.
3. Purpose of Visits: Eligibility Verification vs. Criminal Investigation
The third criterion in determining whether a particular action constitutes a
search is to examine the purpose of the intrusion. In general, the purpose of a
"search" is to obtain evidence of a crime."88 But proponents of welfare "walk
through" home visits claimed that the purpose of the visits was not to search for
(2006) (No. 04-55122).
181. Erik G. Luna, Welfare Fraud and the Fourth Amendment, 24 PEPP. L. REV. 1235, 1252 (1997). Mr.
Luna is currently Professor of Law at the University of Utah Law School and co-director of the Utah Criminal
Justice Center. The University of Utah: S.J. Quinney College of Law, Profiles, http://www.law.utah.
edu/profiles/default.asp?PersonlD=74&name=Luna,Erik (last visited May 31, 2008) (on file with the McGeorge
Law Review).
182. Luna, supra note 181, at 1252-53.
183. Compare Sanchez v. County of San Diego, 464 F.3d 916, 924 n.11 (9th Cir. 2006) ("This
conclusion [that visits conducted by peace officers need not be searches in the criminal context] is further
supported by ... Burger, [where] the Court upheld warrantless inspection of a vehicle dismantling business by
uniformed police officers."), with id. at 934 n.2 (Fisher, J., dissenting) ("The majority's reliance on New York v.
Burger to dismiss this differentiating aspect is misguided." (citations omitted)).
184. Id. at 934 n.2 (Fisher, J., dissenting).
185. 482 U.S. 691 (1986).
186. Sanchez, 464 F.3d at 924 n. 11.
187. In New York v. Burger, uniformed police officers searched a commercial auto dismantling shop.
Under the Colonnade-Biswell doctrine, the Supreme Court held that there were situations in "closely regulated
industries" where uniformed and armed police officers were not required to obtain a search warrant to conduct a
search. Burger, 482 U.S. at 691, 700-01.
188. See Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 317-18 (1971) (explaining why the visits are not searches).
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criminal activity. 89 Yet, as peace officers, these investigators have a duty to
report any criminal activity.' 9° What the investigators see, including the interior of
closets and medicine cabinets, may reveal that the applicant has made a false
representation on the welfare application.' 91 The investigators also check the
applicant's assets to determine whether there was any falsification on the
application. 9'
But the potential for criminal liability remains. Regardless of investigators'
hesitancy or unwillingness to prosecute, their ability to report evidence of
misrepresentations could lead to criminal sanctions.' 93 California law makes it a
crime to knowingly make misrepresentations on a welfare application.'94 Any
false statement or "fail[ure] to disclose a material fact to obtain aid" is a
misdemeanor.195 To allow law enforcement officials to circumvent the recipient's
Fourth Amendment rights on the basis that they were not purposely looking for
evidence of a crime would render Fourth Amendment protection toothless.
Welfare home visits as seen in Sanchez are "searches" within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment. They intrude on the sanctity of the home, a privacy
interest protected not only in the text of our Constitution but also by Supreme
Court decisions. The government actors who conduct the home visits are charged
with law enforcement capabilities and should be held to a stricter standard than
that applied to a welfare caseworker. Despite the proffered purpose of the welfare
home visit, the officials nevertheless have the potential to recover evidence
leading to an applicant's prosecution.
B. Fourth Amendment Exceptions
Once a government action is considered a "search," the analysis focuses on
whether the search is reasonable.1 96 Warrantless searches are presumptively
189. Brief for Appellee at 14, Sanchez, 464 F.3d 916 (No. 04-55122).
190. Sanchez, 464 F.3d at 934 (9th Cir. 2006) (Fisher, J., dissenting); see CAL. PEN. CODE § 830.1(a)
(West 1985 & Supp. 2008) (defining a "peace officer" as "any inspector or investigator employed in that
capacity in the office of a district attorney"); CAL. PEN. CODE § 830.35(a) (West Supp. 2008) (noting that any
welfare fraud investigator whose duty is to enforce the Welfare and Institutions Code is a peace officer).
191. Sanchez, 464 F.3d at 919 (9th Cir. 2006).
192. Reply Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 7, Sanchez, 464 F.3d 916 (No. 04-55122).
193. But see Sanchez, 464 F.3d at 919 ("While the investigators are required to report evidence of
potential criminal wrongdoing for further investigation and prosecution, there is no evidence that any criminal
prosecutions for welfare fraud have stemmed from inconsistencies uncovered during a Project 100% home
visit.").
194. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 11486 (West 2001 & Supp. 2008).
195. Id.
196. Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652-53 (1995) ("[W]here there was no clear
practice, either approving or disapproving the type of search at issue, at the time the constitutional provision
was enacted, whether a particular search meets the reasonableness standard 'is judged by balancing its intrusion
on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests."'
(quoting Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989))).
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unreasonable unless a recognized judicial exception applies."' One commentator
has characterized Fourth Amendment jurisprudence as "not only complex and
contradictory, but often perverse."'1 98
This section examines and analyzes the application of three exceptions in the
context of welfare home visits. First, this section concludes that the "special
needs" exception is inapplicable to welfare administration. Second, it notes that
consent is insufficient given the circumstances under which the recipient offers
consent. Third, administrative searches that operate outside the confines of the
Fourth Amendment are distinguishable from the searches in Sanchez.
1. "Special Needs" Exception
The Sanchez decision misapplied the "special needs" exception to validate
welfare home visits. Originally formulated in the context of warrantless searches,
the evolution of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence suggests that the exception has
increasingly become the test employed in suspicionless search cases.'99 The
Supreme Court has held "special needs" to include the government's interest in
• 201
maintaining order in public schools, 2°° deterring drug use by schoolchildren,
2012
ensuring the integrity of Customs employees, ensuring the safety of thetraveling public on railroads,2 3 and ensuring safety on public highways.2°4
197. See Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006) ("It is a basic principle of Fourth Amendment
law that searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable ...
Nevertheless, because the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is 'reasonableness' the warrant
requirement is subject to certain exceptions." (citations omitted)).
198. Akhil R. Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REv. 757, 758 (1994)
("Criminals go free, while honest citizens are intruded upon in outrageous ways with little or no real remedy.").
199. Nicholas v. Goord, 430 F.3d 652, 661 (2d Cir. 2005).
200. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 353 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (while this decision
did not employ a "special needs" analysis, the decision stands to explain that school searches present special
needs in order to maintain order in schools).
201. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 515 U.S. at 657 ("Somewhat like adults who choose to participate in a
'closely regulated industry,' students who voluntarily participate in school athletics have reason to expect
intrusions upon normal rights and privileges, including privacy.").
202. See Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 666 (1989) (drug-testing program
of Customs employees aimed toward deterring drug use amongst those eligible for sensitive positions held to
have purpose beyond law enforcement).
203. See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 620 (1989) ("The Government's
interest in regulating the conduct of railroad employees to ensure safety, like its supervision of probationers or
regulated industries, or its operation of a government office, school, or prison, 'likewise presents special needs
beyond normal law enforcement that may justify departures from the usual warrant and probable-cause
requirements."' (quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873-74 (1987)).
204. See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 41-42 (2000) (held that drug checkpoints whose
primary purpose was crime control violated Fourth Amendment, but the court suggested that checkpoints to
serve a highway safety interest would be valid); Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990)
(checkpoint program upheld where the state interest was reducing the immediate hazard produced by drunk
drivers on the highway).
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Application of the exception should not extend to the validation of welfare
home visits. °5 Under the exception, the government may justify a search where
"special needs, beyond the need of law enforcement, make the warrant and
probable-cause requirement impracticable. ' '216 Once the Court defines the
"ultimate purpose" of the search, it balances the government interests against the
privacy interests of the individual to "assess the practicality of the warrant and
probable-cause requirements in the particular context., 20 7 A search can be valid
"where privacy interests implicated by the search are minimal, and where an
important governmental interest furthered by the intrusion would be placed in
jeopardy by a requirement of individualized suspicion." 200
Another Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals case illustrates why the "special
needs" exception should not have been applied in Sanchez. Three months prior to
the Sanchez decision, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision in United
States v. Scot 2 9 rejected a proffered "special need" in the home search of an
individual awaiting trial.21 ° In Scott, after an arrest for drug possession, the
defendant agreed to conditions that forced him to submit to warrantless searches,
including drug testing.21' Days later, the police entered the defendant's home and
administered a drug test.1 2 The government argued that drug testing of persons
awaiting trial served "special needs," but the court rejected such a claim.2 3 The
court held that the privacy interest of an individual awaiting trial surpassed the
government's "special need." Writing for the majority, Judge Alex Kozinski
reasoned that the government search of the defendant's home intruded upon the
defendant's privacy interest:
Unlike public school students, who have limited privacy interests
because of the state's special custodial role, Customs employees, who
occupy sensitive government positions, or drivers and railway
employees, whose activities impose safety risks on others, pre-trial
releasees are ordinary people who have been accused of a crime but are
214presumed innocent.
205. Contra Sanchez v. County of San Diego, 464 F.3d 916, 925-28 (9th Cir. 2006).
206. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987) (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325
(1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring)).
207. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619.
208. 79 C.J.S. Searches § 60 (2008).
209. 450 F.3d 863 (9th Cir. 2006).
210. Id.
211. Id. at 865.
212. Id. (noting that despite police action based on an informant's tip, the police conceded that they did
not have probable cause).
213. Id. at 869 (explaining that the government argued for two needs: protection of the community and
ensuring that witnesses show up to trial).
214. Id. at 871 (citations omitted).
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According to the court, while the defendant's assent did decrease his
expectation of privacy, the court held that such assent was "insufficient to
eliminate his expectation of privacy in his home."25
In Sanchez, the proper determination should have centered on the privacy
interest of the recipient in the home, and a determination that eligibility
verification was not sufficient to overcome such a protected interest. Sanchez
acknowledged that the privacy interest in the home is "significant., 216 However, it
held that the county had articulated a "special need" in eligibility verification of
recipients.217 Turning away from the protection inside the home that Scott
afforded to persons awaiting trial, the Sanchez court noted, "a person's
relationship with the state can reduce that person's expectation of privacy even
within the sanctity of the home.,2 The majority turned to Griffin, where the
Court found that a probationer's relationship with the state lowered his legitimate
expectation of privacy. Namely, the court noted that the probationer's
relationship with the state centered on the intensive supervision and rehabilitation
of a state's probation program, similar to the relationship a welfare recipient has
with the distributors of aid."9
Reacting to the majority's "relationship with the state" reasoning, the dissent
noted that the government provides many benefits, like welfare, that affect the
recipient's relationship with the state.2 20 The court noted:
If the majority is correct that a person's expectation of privacy in the
home is reduced any time he or she has a relationship with the state that
requires an eligibility determination, then there seems little to prevent the
government from implementing a home visit program similar to Project
100% with respect to those beneficiaries as well.22
Moreover, the probationer's relationship with the state, unlike that of the
welfare recipient, is "criminal. 222 The dissent noted that Griffin was the only case
where a "special need" permitted the search of anyone's home.223 In fact, the
"special needs" analysis reveals that "[w]ith the exception of convicted felons,
neither we nor the Supreme Court has ever held that an individual's privacy
215. Id. at 871-72 ("We are especially reluctant to indulge the claimed special need here because Scott's
privacy interest in his home, where the officers came to demand the urine sample, is at its zenith.").
216. Sanchez v. County of San Diego, 464 F.3d 916, 927 (9th Cir. 2006).
217. Id. at 926.
218. Id. at 927 (emphasis omitted and added).
219. Id. at 925.
220. Id. at 941 n. 12 (Fisher, J., dissenting).
221. Id. (noting that other government programs could be implicated as well, such as Medicare,
Medicaid, disability benefits, student financial aid, and lunch subsidies).
222. See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 874 (1987) ("Probation is simply one point (or, more
accurately, one set of points) on a continuum of possible punishments ranging from solitary confinement in a
maximum-security facility to a few hours of mandatory community service.").
223. Sanchez, 464 F.3d at 939 n. 11 (Fisher, J., dissenting).
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expectation in the home was reduced to a level of unreasonableness as a result of
,,224their relationship with the state.
Comparing the welfare home visit to other similarly situated benefit-
conferring programs, the government appears hesitant to go to the same lengths
that they do in Sanchez.22s The Ninth Circuit denied en banc to rehear Sanchez.
Judge Pregerson's dissent echoed Judge Fisher's earlier comments when he
explained that the government does not perform similar searches on farmers
226receiving subsidies.. Indeed, the field of farm subsidies poses similar problems
in fraud that arise in welfare context. Take, for example, a recent report by the
Government Accounting Office (GAO) that showed the U.S. Department of
Agriculture had distributed over a billion dollars in the past seven years to
deceased farmers.227 In another example, the report cited payments to an Illinois
corn farm that collected benefits on behalf of its owner who lived in Florida.2 28 In
total, the GAO report found that 38% of cases had "'weaknesses,' including
'nonexistent or vague' documentation.1 29 The absence of home visits or similar
intrustions on the recipients of other benefit-conferring programs underscores
230
why the program in Sanchez should be subjected to greater scrutiny.
Also, one might ask whether the need for "eligibility verification" defies
conventional wisdom. The public accepts the idea that welfare fraud is rampant
and that cheaters outnumber eligible applicants.23' However, the truth may not
comport with the commonly held belief.232 For example, New York City began a
plan in 1995 to root out welfare fraud by fingerprinting welfare recipients.233 Over
148,000 recipients were fingerprinted, but the city found only forty-three cases of
double dipping.234 Other counties in the state fingerprinted over 24,000 recipients
224. Id. at 941 (emphasis added).
225. See id. (asking why society does not insist upon the same of others whose relationship with the
state is that of a recipient as well).
226. Sanchez v. County of San Diego, 483 F.3d 965, 969 (9th Cir. 2007) (mem.) (Pregerson, J.,
dissenting).
227. Sarah Cohen, Deceased Farmer Got USDA Payments: Study Finds Lack of Case Reviews, WASH.
POST, July 23, 2007, at Al.
228. Id.; cf. Luna, supra note 181, at 1238 (noting that a welfare recipient in California had collected
welfare on behalf of her children living in Virginia).
229. Cohen, supra note 227.
230. See Sanchez, 483 F.3d at 969 (Pregerson, J., dissenting) (describing the situation as "shameful").
231. See Luna, supra note 181, at 1235. ("Welfare fraud is an epidemic.")
232. While campaigning for President, Ronald Reagan invoked the image of the "welfare queen," a
figure who collected benefits under different names, drove a Cadillac from welfare office to welfare office, and
wore designer jeans. Years later, David Gergen, Reagan's director of communications, when questioned about
the basis of such claims, said that "the public did not demand literal authenticity 'so long as the symbolic truth
[was] defensible."' Evelyn Z. Brodkin, Book Review, The Making of an Enemy: How Welfare Policies
Construct the Poor, 18 LAw & SOC'Y INQUIRY 647, 647 (1993).
233. Kimberly J. McLarin, Welfare Fingerprinting Finds Most People are Telling Truth, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 29, 1995, at A23.
234. Id.
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and turned up only seventeen cases of fraud . 35 If these numbers are indicative of
the amount of fraud, the need for eligibility verification may not be as great as
the Sanchez court had surmised.
In conclusion, the "special needs" exception illustrates that the privacy
interest of an individual in the home outweighs the "need" for eligibility
verification. Therefore, the program does not meet the necessary requirements of
'reasonableness."
2. Consent
The majority in Sanchez points to the welfare recipients' consent to the home
visit to show that the search fits a recognized exception to the Fourth
Amendment. 236 An individual's immunity from an unreasonable search may be
waived by consent, which is a valid exception to the Fourth's Amendment's
prohibition on unreasonable searches. 37 Consent must be unequivocal, and it
must be given freely and voluntarily.238 Voluntariness is measured by the totality
239
of the circumstances.
Welfare home visits raise two concerns. The first concern is whether the
consent is free and voluntary. If such consent is valid, the second issue is whether
conditioning the receipt of welfare benefits on the waiver of a constitutional right
triggers the "Unconstitutional Conditions" doctrine.
A welfare recipient's "consent" to a home visit does not justify the search
because of the consequences surrounding a refusal.' 4° In Sanchez, proponents of
home visits pointed to two occasions where the applicant agrees to the visit. 24'
First, the applicant acknowledges on the application that a home visit will
occur.2 42 Second, the investigators ask to enter the recipient's home at the time of
the search and enter only if the owner permits.243 However, applicants are aware
that the agency will deny aid if met with refusal.244 The parent is placed in an
untenable moral situation where they must balance the right to privacy against
the needs of their children.2 4 Failure to provide necessities for one's child is not
235. Id.
236. See Sanchez v. County of San Diego, 464 F.3d 916, 924 (9th Cir. 2006) (noting that the San Diego
program contained the same "procedural safeguards" as Wyman in that recipients consented to any search).
237. 79 C.J.S. Searches § 151 (2008); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973).
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. See Charles R. Bogle, "Unconscionable" Conditions: A Contractual Analysis of Conditions on
Public Assistance Benefits, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 193, 233 (1994) ("Where the assistance is offered, it is
extremely unlikely that a poor person would feel herself entirely 'free' to refuse the offer even if she did not like
the conditions under which it was made.").
241. Sanchez, 464 F.3d at 924.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Opening Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 12, Sanchez, 464 F.3d 916 (No. 04-55122).
245. See Reyes v. Edmunds, 472 F. Supp. 1218, 1226 (D. Minn. 1979) ("What greater inhibition to
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only a crime, but parents may be stripped of their parental rights as well . 6 Yet
the Sanchez court overlooked these concerns and noted that the recipients'
consent acted as a procedural safeguard.247
United States Supreme Court decisions have pointed to the importance of
welfare benefits as necessities for sustaining life.48 Commentator Charles Bogle
recognized that the doctrine of unconscionability in the law of contracts provided
a more suitable model by which to analyze the conditions placed on welfare:
"Given that disparity in bargaining power . . . the position of public assistance
recipients, as powerless and essentially at the mercy of the government
dispensing the benefits, lends itself particularly well to unconscionability
principles. 2 49 Bogle then recommended that conditions placed on the receipt of
welfare benefits should be subjected to a modified analysis to determine whether
the transaction is substantively unconscionable.250 Here, the pressure on the
welfare recipient leaves no choice in accepting the condition, and any "consent"
cannot be considered free and voluntary.
In addition, conditioning the receipt of public assistance benefits on waiving
Fourth Amendment rights raises the doctrine of Unconstitutional Conditions. 21'
According to the Unconstitutional Conditions doctrine, "[G]overnment may not
grant a benefit on the condition that the beneficiary surrender a constitutional
right.''2 2 The results of this analysis would be clear: the program grants benefits
on the recipient's waiver of Fourth Amendment protection. Sanchez avoided this
problem by reverting to the facts that home visits are not "searches" and thus do
not implicate any constitutional right.253 The court again refused to invoke the
doctrine because it found that home visits were not "searches. 2 4
In sum, the recipients' consent to the welfare home searches does not suffice
to validate the search.
freedom can there be than that which a welfare recipient faces when subjected to a threat by the authorities to
eliminate her sole means of providing food, shelter and clothing for her family?"). The number of children in
poverty is staggering. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., OFFICE OF FAMILY ASSISTANCE, STATE
ESTIMATES FOR CHILDREN UNDER 18 IN POVERTY FOR U.S., available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/ofa/
annualreport5/0904.htm (listing the California child poverty rate at 24.6% of children under 18).
246. See CAL. PEN. CODE § 270 (West 2008) (punishing willful omission to furnish necessaries as a
misdemeanor).
247. Sanchez, 464 F.3d at 924.
248. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627 (1969) (describing welfare aid as the "very means to
subsist-food, shelter, and other necessities of life"); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1967) (noting that
welfare benefits are "the very means by which to live" and that "lack[ing] independent resources, [the welfare
recipient's] situation becomes immediately desperate").
249. Bogle, supra note 240, at 229.
250. Id. at 230.
251. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1415 (1989).
252. Id.
253. Sanchez v. County of San Diego, 464 F.3d 916, 930 (9th Cir. 2006).
254. Id. at 930-31.
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3. Administrative Needs: The "Closely Regulated" Industry
Another justification for welfare home visits is that they lie outside the
Fourth Amendment because they are part of a regulated welfare administration
program. 5s In a "closely regulated" industry, a search that furthers the regulatory
scheme may be valid without any warrant even when uniformed police officers
search in a criminal context. 1 6 In Burger, police officers entered Burger's auto
dismantling shop and asked for records that state law required Burger to
possess.257 He was unable to produce such records, and soofficers then conducted
their search and copied down Vehicle Identification Numbers.25 Comparing
those numbers with those in government records, officers found that the parts
were from stolen automobiles.259
In Burger, the Court extended what was known as the "Colonnade-Biswell"
doctrine where "the reduced expectation of privacy by an owner of commercial
premises in a 'closely regulated' industry" may justify a warrantless intrusion.2'6
The Court held that warrantless administrative searches are valid if they meet
three criteria. 1  First, the regulatory scheme must advance a "'substantial'
government interest."2 62 Second, "the inspections must be 'necessary to further
[the] regulatory scheme."'263 Third, the inspection program "in terms of the
certainty and regularity of its application [must] provid[e] a constitutionally
adequate substitute for a warrant.
' 264
The District Attorney's home visits in Sanchez differ from the administrative
search at issue in Burger. Burger centered on a "closely regulated" industry
where the statutes govern commercial operations. 265 Receiving welfare benefits to
provide necessaries to one's family is not the same as participating in a business
in a "closely regulated" industry. The recipient of welfare benefits does not
255. See id. at 924 nn. 11-12 (noting that the distinction between peace officers in Sanchez and the social
workers in Wyman should not control the outcome as long as the regulatory scheme is properly administrative).
256. New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1986).
257. Id. at 694-95. The Court cited 38 other states with similar statutes that regulated auto-dismantling
businesses. Id. at 698-99 n. 11.
258. Id. at 695.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 701; see also Colonnade Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 74-75 (1970) (defining liquor
distribution as a "closely regulated" business due to its long history of supervision); United States v. Biswell,
406 U.S. 311, 313-15 (1972) (extending the Colonnade holding to the distribution of firearms in pawn shops);
Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 605-06 (1981) (concluding that inspections of mines under federal safety law
fall within Colonnade-Biswell doctrine because mining was a "closely regulated" industry). But see Marshall v.
Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 324 (1978) (concluding that inspections made under occupational safety statutes
are not to fall under the doctrine).
261. Burger, 482 U.S. at 702.
262. Id. (quoting Donovan, 452 U.S. at 602).
263. Id. (quoting Donovan, 452 U.S. at 600).
264. Id. at 703. (quoting Donovan, 452 U.S. at 603).
265. See generally KATZ, supra note 19 (noting that the origination of home visits was originally
welcomed by recipients because of its private nature).
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exercise a choice in whether to turn to life-saving benefits, whereas the auto-
dismantling owner has more freedom to choose his occupation.
Applying the administrative search analysis found in Burger to the searches
in Sanchez yields no valid exception. Undoubtedly, the first criterion is met
because the government does have a substantial interest in curbing welfare fraud,
and home visits effectively combat instances of fraud such as out-of-state
claimants or income-producing parents not listed on the application. Burger's
second criterion insists that the searches be necessary to further a necessary
regulatory scheme. In Burger, inspections were "crucial ... at remedying this
major social problem [of car theft]. 266 The third criterion in Burger turns on the
time, scope, and place of the search and whether the application of the inspection
program provides a "constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant.
267
The location and scope of the searches in Sanchez differ from the search in
Burger. The Burger search took place in an auto-dismantling business where
261
state commercial statutes "narrowly defined" the scope of the search.
Investigators entered the premises for the sole purpose of recording the Vehicle
Identification Numbers. 9 In Sanchez, officials entered the home of the recipient
and asked to search the recipient's bedrooms, closets, and medicine cabinets.270
Moreover, in Sanchez, investigators sought to verify a recipient's "assets," a task
that could provide far more latitude to the investigator's search. 271 In addition,
Burger noted that the business owner's choice to enter a "closely regulated"
business such as auto-dismantling comes with full knowledge of the lower
272
expectation of privacy. The same cannot be said of those seeking public
assistance because recipients rarely have the choice to enter welfare.273
In sum, home visits do not fall under the administrative exception to the
Fourth Amendment.
V. SOLUTIONS: INSTITUTING A SHOWING OF CAUSE
274Welfare fraud exists. However, the means to combat such fraud is the point
of great debate.275 This Part examines the action needed to untangle the
266. Burger, 482 U.S. at 710.
267. Id. at 702-03.
268. Id. at 702.
269. Id.
270. Sanchez v. County of San Diego, 464 F.3d 916, 919 (9th Cir. 2006).
271. Brief for Appellee at 6, Sanchez, 464 F.3d at 919 (No. 04-55122).
272. Burger, 482 U.S. at 701.
273. See Amy Mulzer, The Doorkeeper and the Grand Inquisitor: The Central Role of Verification
Procedures in Means-Tested Welfare Programs, 36 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L.REv. 663, 670-71 (2005) (noting that
investigative procedures, such as contacting neighbors of recipients, have been used to relieve applicants of
what used to be harsh document-based verification measures).
274. See Luna, supra note 181, at 1235.
275. Id.
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convoluted constitutional analysis that accompanies welfare home searches and
proposes a solution that addresses both the government's interest in maintaining
integrity in the system and the weighty privacy interest at stake.
First, the Supreme Court should overturn Wyman or at least clarify its
holding. Applying Wyman to any so-called "welfare home search" leads to
questionable standards for the future.276 Moreover, Wyman's Fourth Amendment
reasoning was even called into question by Sanchez, where the court
acknowledged that Wyman's Fourth Amendment reasoning, as it stands today, is
not sound:
We note that Wyman's reasoning on the question of whether the home
visits are searches under the Fourth Amendment arguably has been called
into question by the Supreme Court's subsequent Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence. The Court has since repeatedly held that consensual
administrative searches qualify as searches under the Fourth
Amendment, even though refusal to consent carried no criminal penalty
and the searches were not part of a criminal investigation.2 7 7
The court cited Agostini v. Felton, holding that if a precedent directly
controls a case before a Court of Appeals, then the Court of Appeals should
follow that precedent in spite of the reasoning in other lines of decisions that may
point to the contrary.278 Thus, only the Supreme Court has the power to take the
279proper step.
If the Court held that welfare visits were indeed "searches" within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment, then the next step in meeting the
government's interest as well as the recipient's interest would be to examine
probable cause requirements. Section A of this Part examines the probable cause
requirement under the Fourth Amendment and asks whether the searches should
be justified accordingly. Section B discusses the standard of probable cause used
in administrative cases and argues that it may present a solution acceptable to
both sides of the debate.
276. See Sanchez v. County of San Diego, 483 F.3d 965, 969 (9th Cir. 2007) (Pregerson, J., dissenting)
("It is fair to expect that counties throughout the Ninth Circuit may change their programs to take advantage of
the legal latitude the ruling in Sanchez affords them.").
277. Sanchez v. County of San Diego, 464 F.3d 916, 922 fn.8 (9th Cir. 2006).
278. Id. ("'If a precedent of this Court has direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons
rejected in some other line of decisions, the Court of Appeals should follow the case which directly controls,
leaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions."' (citing Rodriquez de Quijas v.
Shearson/American Express Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989))).
279. Id.
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A. Probable Cause Requirement
Under the Fourth Amendment, a valid search warrant requires a showing of
probable cause. s° The question is whether a showing of probable cause is
infeasible. The fundamental reasoning behind circumventing the traditional
probable cause requirement is that certain circumstances exist where seeking a
warrant is impractical. 28 ' As noted earlier, the "special needs" exception requires
the court to balance the privacy interests of the individual, the character of the
• 282
intrusion, and the state's interest. Analysis of these factors illustrates whether a
showing of probable cause can and should be required.
The privacy interests of the individual are substantial because of the location
of the search. Privacy in the home is a fundamental right. 283 "An individual's
home lies at the zenith of privacy interests. ' 2 4 Indeed, Supreme Court decisions
281have upheld the sanctity of the home as an area of privacy.
The character of the intrusion is invasive. In Vernonia School District 47J v.
Acton,286 the Court found that a urine test represented a minor intrusion. It
reasoned that the degree of intrusion was negligible because the action consisted
of conditions nearly identical to those typically encountered in public restrooms
on a daily basis.2  The Court also found that urinalysis tests looked only for
drugs-nothing more. 289 Here, the state discounted the intrusiveness of the
government action by asserting that the investigators merely "walk through. 298
Unlike a trip to the restroom, a law enforcement "walk through," which includes
searches of medicine cabinets and closets, can hardly qualify as something so
mundane as going to the toilet. And while in Vernonia urinalysis tests were
specifically limited to detecting drugs, here investigators have much wider
discretion-they look in medicine cabinets, closets, and laundry baskets. 29'
The state's interest in verifying that only the eligible receive funds is
substantial.292 Taxpayers have a right to expect that the intended beneficiaries of
280. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
281. See generally New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985); Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868
(1987).
282. Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 830-34 (2002).
283. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001) (cited in Sanchez v. County of San Diego, 483 F.3d
965, 968 (9th Cir. 2007) (mem.) (Pregerson, J., dissenting)).
284. United States v. Scott, 450 F.3d 863, 871 (9th Cir. 2006).
285. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976) (noting that the "sanctity of private
dwellings" is typically afforded the "most stringent" Fourth Amendment protection).
286. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1994).
287. Id. at 658.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Brief for Appellee at 11, Sanchez v. County of S.D., 464 F.3d 916 (9th Cir. 2006) (No. 04-55122).
291. Opening Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 2, Sanchez, 464 F.3d 916 (No. 04-55122).
292. Sanchez, 464 F.3d 916 at 923.
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aid are eligible for that aid.293 However, the state employs other means to assess
the eligibility of applicants. Applicants must provide documentation under the
threat of criminal sanction and the state examines database records.9
Investigators even contact third parties about the applicant.9
But to what extent do home visits advance the state's interest beyond what
the state already accomplishes by other fraud-fighting methods? The answer lies
in the numbers. The Sanchez court pointed to a seven percent increase in the
"denial" rate and a four to five percent increase in application withdrawals since
the program's inception as evidence that the home search program was
combating fraud.296 What the court failed to mention is that under the program, a
"denial" occurs whenever an investigator does not conduct a "walk through. 297
Therefore, if seven percent of aid applicants exercised their refusal to consent to
an investigator's request to search the home, the County would record that as an
increase in the denial rate. The court also failed to mention that increased
298personnel may have increased the denial rate. While caseloads have
dramatically decreased since the inception of the home search program, the
amount of investigators in the District Attorney's office has remained constant.299
Yet, with no analysis beyond simply pointing to what it called a "logical
assumption," the court overstated the effectiveness of the program.30
Measured against these factors is the impracticality of requiring a warrant. In
Griffin, the Court found that the interjection of a magistrate's decision to
determine whether a warrant should issue would defeat the purpose of a
probation program-to "counsel" the probationer."" Looking at welfare home
visits in Sanchez, one can see that no such relationship between the investigator
and the recipient exists. 3°z In the absence of such a relationship, the warrant
requirement should not be viewed as impractical.
In conclusion, the privacy interests of the recipient in his or her home
outweigh the government's interest in confirming eligibility, and the character of
293. Id.
294. See CAL. PEN. CODE § 11482 (West Supp. 2008) (noting that a false statement given in a welfare
application is a misdemeanor).
295. But see Opening Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 8, Sanchez, 464 F.3d 916 (No. 04-55122) (noting
that investigators' "unlimited" collateral contacts with third parties were enjoined as violating of DSS policies).
296. Sanchez, 464 F.3d at 928.
297. See id. at 919 n.1 ("The County has conceded that an applicant's failure to allow a home visit will
generally result in the denial of benefits because the [eligibility technician] is unable to adequately verify the
applicant's eligibility without the information included in the D.A. investigator's report.").
298. Opening Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 10, Sanchez, 464 F.3d 916 (No. 04-55122).
299. Id. at 10.
300. Sanchez, 464 F.3d at 928.
301. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987) (analogizing to a parent who would need to seek a
warrant to search the room of his or her child).
302. See supra Part IV.A.2 (where investigator in Sanchez mentioned that home visits were not
rehabilitative).
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the intrusion is traditionally invasive. Therefore, Fourth Amendment safeguards
would require the government to obtain a search warrant upon probable cause.
B. Administrative Probable Cause
Administrative search warrants, normally used in the context of building or
workplace safety inspections, might serve as a model for search warrants used in
welfare administration. 3 Using the state's existing statutes for administrative
warrants in the context of welfare administration would enable welfare agencies
to combat fraud by more particularized suspicion-as opposed to blanket
suspicionless searches.
While probable cause offers the most Fourth Amendment protection to
welfare recipients, other means exist which may safeguard recipient privacy and
give the government the means to ensure eligibility. A magistrate issues
administrative inspection warrants under "probable cause."3°4 "[Administrative]
probable cause exists if reasonable legislative or administrative standards for
conducting an inspection are satisfied., 305 The Supreme Court determined that
unlike criminal investigative searches, the need for an administrative search is
"weighed in terms of these reasonable goals of code enforcement."3°6 California
already has standards that, if amended to apply to welfare administration, could
satisfy the needs of welfare investigators.' °7 The warrant would require a
threshold showing of "cause."3 8 As described below, a showing of cause could
issue based on facts gathered by or made known to authorities, but the judge
issuing the warrant serves as a gatekeeper and referee.3°9 The judge limits the
scope of the search so as to give law enforcement the tools it needs without
unduly burdening the rights of the person searched. 3' The warrant is valid until
303. See Luna, supra note 181, at 1287-88 (noting that administrative search warrants do apply to
building, labor, health, and safety codes, but until legislative action, the warrant remains only a "theoretical
possibility").
304. 79 C.J.S. Searches § 245 (2008).
305. Id.
306. Camara v. Mun. Ct., 387 U.S. 523, 535 (1967).
307. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1822.50-1822.59 (West 2007); Luna, supra note 181, at 1287-88.
308. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1822.51 ("An inspection warrant shall be issued upon cause, unless some
other provision of state or federal law makes another standard applicable. An inspection warrant shall be
supported by an affidavit, particularly describing the place, dwelling, structure, premises, or vehicle to be
inspected and the purpose for which the inspection is made. In addition, the affidavit shall contain either a
statement that consent to inspect has been sought and refused or facts or circumstances reasonably justifying the
failure to seek such consent."); id. § 1822.52 ("Cause shall be deemed to exist if either reasonable legislative or
administrative standards for conducting a routine or area inspection are satisfied with respect to the particular
place, dwelling, structure, premises, or vehicle, or there is reason to believe that a condition of nonconformity
exists with respect to the particular place, dwelling, structure, premises, or vehicle.").
309. Id. § 1822.52.
310. Id. § 1822.53.
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the time specified but for no more than fourteen days and may only be executed
during regular business hours without forcible entry.3"
A search warrant similar to that employed in home inspections would give
the government the power it needs to ensure the integrity of a welfare
administration program without forcing recipients to surrender their privacy. For
example, a simple phone call to the welfare agency that a recipient has an
"absent" parent or that there are no children in the household would be enough to
result in such a search warrant."2 Moreover, limiting the number of searches to
only those suspected of fraud might reduce the cost of law enforcement and
thereby save funds.
Allowing searches of welfare recipients' homes to occur only upon a
showing of cause, whether "probable" or "administrative," would bring integrity
to the system from all sides. It would ensure that recipients comply with the law
and allow them the same constitutional protections of other citizens.
VI. CONCLUSION
Intruding into the homes of the poor has existed since the scientific charity
movements of the nineteenth century.3 3 As the face of welfare has changed, so have
the methods and goals for its distribution.1 4 The growth of the program gave many
people access to the aid they so desperately needed. But the symbolic truth that there
are two types of poor, the deserving and undeserving, continues to inform our views
regarding public assistance.
As Judge Pregerson noted, thousands of persons are the recipients of government
benefits; however, the poor are the ones subjected to intrusions of the home-ahome
that has been afforded special protection not only in the Constitution but also in
many Supreme Court decisions."' The Fourth Amendment declares "the right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses and effects . . ,,316 While Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence has carved out numerous exceptions for various
circumstances, demanding that the poorest of society give up their privacy for the
basic necessities of life truly seems "shameful" and "perverse. 317
311. Id. § 1822.55.
312. Luna, supra note 181, at 1287-88; see SignOnSanDiego.com, Dear Abby: Your Tax Dollars at
Play: Woman Uses Welfare to Finance Frolicking, April 18, 2007, available at http://www.signonsandiego.
con/uniontrib/20070418/news lcl8abby.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (where advice
columnist encourages observer of welfare fraud to report evidence of fraud to authorities).
313. See KATZ, supra note 19.
314. See Handler, supra note 38, at 133-37 (describing the changes in welfare distribution pre-
PRWORA).
315. Sanchez v. County of San Diego, 483 F.3d 965, 969 (9th Cir. 2007) (Pregerson, J., dissenting); see
discussion supra Part IV.A. 1.
316. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
317. See Sanchez, 483 F.3d at 969 ("This situation is shameful."); Amar, supra note 198, at 758 ("The
result is a vast jumble of judicial pronouncements that is not merely complex and contradictory, but often
perverse.").
